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Abstract
The methods of quantum cryptography enable one to have perfectly secure
communication lines, whereby the laws of quantum physics protect the pri-
vacy of the data exchanged. Each quantum-cryptography scheme has its own
security criteria that need to be met in a practical implementation. We find,
however, that the generally accepted criteria are flawed for a whole class of
such schemes.
Quantum states that, geometrically speaking, constitute the edges of a high-
dimensional pyramid are such that there are equal transition amplitudes between
each pair of states. Then, if either “edge state” occurs with uniform a priori
probability, one cannot be sure which one is the case. The odds for guessing
the state right are maximized by a well-known measurement scheme, the “square
root measurement” (SRM),1 but, as we show here, optimal knowledge—in the
information-theoretic sense—is obtained by a different procedure, the “informa-
tion maximizing scheme” (IMS). Our findings may be of considerable importance
for the security of quantum cryptography and also seem to have a bearing on the
quest for optimal quantum cloning machines.
In the situations relevant for quantum cryptography, the common angle be-
tween the edges of the state pyramid is acute.‡ The SRM is essentially a projection
onto one of the edges of a related pyramid with right angles between the edges.
In marked contrast, the IMS projects either onto the edges of a pyramid with an
obtuse angle between the edges or onto the symmetry axis of the state pyramid.
The case of a three-dimensional pyramid is illustrated in the insert of Fig. 1.
Matters are analogous in N = 4, 5, . . . dimensions.
‡See, e.g., ref. 2 and references therein, in particular refs. 3 and 4
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Figure 1: Difference ∆I = IIMS − ISRM in the mutual information as obtained
by the IMS or the SRM, for N = 3, . . . , 10, 20, 100, 500, as a function of the
cosine of the common angle between the edges. The insert illustrates the case
of three-dimensional pyramids: In the yellow state pyramid the common angle
is acute. For the IMS, one has the blue pyramid with an obtuse angle between
the edges, plus a projection on the state that corresponds to the red arrow, the
symmetry axis of the yellow state pyramid. For the SRM, there is no such red-
arrow contribution and the respective blue pyramid has pairwise perpendicular
edges.
Figure 1 shows by how much the IMS outperforms the SRM for N = 3, 4,
. . . , 10, 20, 100, 500 by plotting, as a function of the cosine of the angle between
the edges, the difference ∆I = IIMS − ISRM in the (properly normalized
§) mutual
information that would be shared between the sender and receiver of the edge
states of the state pyramid. In the quantum-cryptography application, the mutual
information values IIMS and ISRM are the relevant numerical measures of what
the eavesdropper can find out by the respective measurement schemes. At least
for the N range in the figure, we note that (i) ∆I increases with the number N
of transmitted states; and (ii) that the range of angles, for which this difference
is substantial, also grows with N . For pyramids in this angle range, the usual
security analysis, which considers only the SRM scheme, is thus invalid and must
§That is: All Shannon entropies are computed with logarithms to base N .
2
be modified to account for the better performance of the IMS.
In Fig. 1 we are focusing on the narrow pyramids of cryptographic relevance.
For N = 3, Shor5 found a similar deviation for rather wide pyramids (negative
abscissa values in the plot), but they are of no concern here.
In the higher-dimensional quantum cryptography protocols analyzed so far3, 4, 2
the eavesdropper examines state pyramids of the kind discussed here and per-
forms the SRM. Our results thus affect the security criteria for these protocols in
favor of the eavesdropper as she can find out more by employing the IMS rather
than the SRM. We note further that the security analysis in refs. 3 and 4, which is
actually based on universal cloning machines, is equivalent to considering states
pyramids with the SRM. Accordingly, our finding that the IMS is superior im-
plies that one must reexamine the criteria by which one judges the optimality of
universal cloning machines in applications to quantum cryptography.
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